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As an innovative financing behavior, equity pledge breaks the limit of 
traditional financing, and broadens the financing channels of companies 
and major shareholders. This paper comprehensively considers the impact 
of controlling shareholder equity pledge on corporate value from three 
research perspectives. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) When 
the equity pledge is not considered, the cash flow rights and voting rights 
of the company owned by the controlling shareholder are positively cor-
related with corporate value. That is, this presents incentive effect, but the 
existence of the separation of the two powers brings the second type of 
agency problem and reduces corporate value. (2) When considering the 
equity pledge, the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge may weaken the 
incentive effect and strengthen the encroachment effect which causing a 
reduction of corporate value. (3) Based on the accounting point of view, 
the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge is negatively correlated with the 
corporate performance, while the concentration of ownership dilutes this 
negative effect. (4) The balance of equity weakens the negative effect of the 
controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on corporate value, thereby reduces 
the negative impact of the equity pledge. 
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1. Introduction
1.1 Research Background
Due to the economic downturn in recent years, the real 
economy development of China has hit a bottleneck. 
Many listed companies have been caught in the tight capi-
tal chain, and a growing number of listed company share-
holders have pledged their equity to finance the company. 
According to the Wind Database, controlling shareholders 
of 3019 listed companies in the A-share market raised 
capital through the pledge of shares, which presents a 
grandeur of “full-stock pledge” by the last trading day of 
2018. 
The equity pledge converts the funds invested by 
shareholders into the company from static to dynamic. Put 
another way, the funds enter the secondary market circula-
tion once again, and the liquidity is greatly enhanced. The 
characteristic of equity pledge is that it not only provides 
loans for the controlling shareholder, but also maintains 
his control over the company. However, the actual cash 
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flow rights are reduced and the degree of separation of the 
two powers is intensified, while the controlling sharehold-
er’s control over the company remains unchanged after 
the pledge. As a result, the controlling shareholder’s cost 
of encroaching on the corporate interests is reduced, and 
the possibility of expanding his own income by sacrificing 
the minority shareholders has increased significantly. 
Since the concentration of shares is a common phenom-
enon in listed companies, many controlling shareholders 
have very strong control and take a special position in the 
listed company. The pledge of the controlling shareholders 
is also easily transmitted to the listed companies through 
various paths, which has a greater impact on corporate 
value. This indicates that although the equity pledge 
brings more benefits to the market, it also brings greater 
risks. 
1.2 Research Objective 
In previous literatures, we found that researches on equity 
pledge are mostly focused on case analysis, which makes 
the conclusions not comprehensive enough to be applied 
to most listed companies. They are highly targeted, but 
inadequately universal. In addition, empirical studies on 
equity pledge are lack of the updated data analysis for the 
fast changing market. Different from the existing research-
es, this paper will analyze the impact of the controlling 
shareholder’s equity pledge behavior on corporate value 
from the perspectives of separation of powers, company 
performance and balance of shares, based on the China’s 
A-share listed companies’ equity pledge in 2014-2017.
The findings of this research are practical for investors. 
First of all, in recent years, equity pledges have grown 
rapidly, which has had a great impact on the market and 
investors. Therefore, based on information asymmetry 
theory, principal-agent theory, etc., this paper combines 
the status quo of equity pledge to conduct empirical anal-
ysis, and helps investors to better understand the financing 
methods.
Secondly, although the development of equity pledge 
is fast, the development of relevant laws and systems has 
not kept pace with the equity pledge, which has brought 
certain challenges to the regulatory authorities. This paper 
proposes corresponding suggestions about governance 
through empirical analysis, and then promotes the regula-
tion of equity pledge.
The current academic researches on equity pledge main-
ly focus on two aspects: First, the analysis of the economic 
consequences of equity pledge, including the impact on 
the corporate stock price, company performance, corporate 
governance and corporate value etc. Second, the motives 
and legal characteristics of the equity pledge are studied. 
Different from the existed articles, the novelty of this 
study lies in:
Firstly, from the perspective of research, this paper con-
ducts a multi-angle analysis of the impact of controlling 
shareholder equity pledge on corporate value. Existing 
researches on the impact of equity pledge on corporate 
value are mostly based on the perspective of ownership 
and control, focusing on the separation of the two powers 
to study the cross-impact effect of equity pledge on own-
ership, control and corporate value. From the perspective 
of China’s current capital market, its practicality is not 
enough. This paper combines the perspective of corporate 
performance and equity balance to comprehensively study 
the impact of controlling shareholder equity pledge on 
corporate value. 
Secondly, this study uses the equity multiplier to mea-
sure financial leverage replacing most of the existing re-
search practices which applied the asset-liability ratio. 
Third, this paper obtains the latest data and distinguish-
es the equity pledge sample and the controlling share-
holder equity pledge sample. Furthermore, the empirical 
analysis is divided into two situations, not considering the 
equity pledge and considering the equity pledge. We in-
clude as much sample data as possible for empirical anal-
ysis to make the results more reliable.
1.3 Literature Review
Li et al. [1] found that the phenomenon of encroachment on 
the corporate assets has increased significantly after the 
controlling shareholder conducts the equity pledge in the 
listed companies. Hao and Liang [2] revealed that the great-
er the proportion of the controlling shareholder’ s equity 
pledge, the more serious the separation of the two powers, 
and the more motivation to encroach on the corporate in-
terests. It is especially true for privately held companies. 
Bozec et al. [3] found that when the controlling share-
holder’s cash flow rights and control rights are unified, 
they do not have a strong intention to damage corporate 
value. Joh [4] believed that the controlling shareholder en-
joys a large degree of control due to the existence of the 
separation of the two powers, and they may use mergers 
and acquisitions to achieve the benefit transfer. The con-
sequence reacts to the capital market, and we observe that 
the corporate share price will be negatively affected and 
fall. Ju [5] noticed that the greater the separation of the two 
powers, the lower corporate value in private enterprises, 
that is, the separation of the two powers has an amplifica-
tion effect in private enterprises.
Yeh [6] found that when the corporate shareholders 
pledge the equity, it will aggravate the agency problem, 
and the pledge ratio is positively related to the agency 
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problem which causes corporate value to be negatively 
affected. Zheng et al. [7] suggested that when the ultimate 
controller of the company is in a difficult position, it is 
more likely to choose equity pledge financing, and con-
troller has a stronger desire to extract company resources 
to meet its own capital needs and damage corporate value. 
Later, Xie et al. [8] further pointed out that major share-
holders have stronger incentives to use the accounting 
policies for market value management after the equity 
pledge, which damages corporate value.
2. Methodology
The empirical part contains three parts. First, the impact 
of the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on corporate 
value is passed on through the separation of the two pow-
ers. Second, the influence of the controlling shareholder’s 
equity pledge on the corporate performance is transmitted 
to corporate value. Last, we investigate the impact of con-
trolling shareholders’ equity pledge on corporate value 
from the perspective of equity balance. 
2.1 Research Hypothesis
2.1.1 The Influence of Controlling Shareholder 
Information on Corporate Value without Consid-
ering Equity Pledge
According to Claessens et al. [9], voting rights are used 
to measure the controlling power, and cash flow rights 
are used to measure the ownership. The equity pledge is 
mainly through affecting ownership, which in turn affects 
corporate value. According to La port et al. [10], the higher 
the cash flow rights owned by the controlling shareholder, 
the higher the sharing benefit, and the less likely to harm 
the corporate interests. In this case, the Hypothesis 1 of 
this paper is proposed:
H1A: The cash flow rights owned by the controlling 
shareholder are positively correlated with corporate value 
when other factors remain unchanged. As the controlling 
shareholder’s cash flow rights increase, corporate value 
will also increase. That is, there is an incentive effect.           
H1B: The control rights owned by the controlling 
shareholder are positively correlated with corporate value 
when other factors remain unchanged. As the controlling 
shareholder’s control increases, corporate value will also 
increase.
Studies have shown that when control rights and cash 
flow rights are inconsistent, especially when the con-
trolling shareholder has a higher proportion of control 
rights with low ownership, the cost of the interest en-
croachment is less. Assuming that there is profit-driven, 
rational controlling shareholders may engage in encroach-
ment [11]. And the greater the separation of the two powers, 
the more serious this encroachment behavior. Based on 
this, the Hypothesis 2 is proposed: 
H2: The degree of separation between cash flow rights 
and control rights is negatively correlated with corporate 
value when other factors remain unchanged. 
2.1.2 The Influence of Controlling Shareholder 
Pledge on Corporate Value
Some literature [2,9] have found that, the corporate ultimate 
controller’s equity pledge will lead to a reduction in its 
actual cash flow rights, resulting in weakening incentives 
and agency problems given that other factors remain 
unchanged. Also, some scholars [7] pointed out that equi-
ty pledges would lead to the “tunneling” behavior, thus 
reduces corporate value. Based on these findings, the Hy-
pothesis 3 and 4 are proposed:
H3A: When other factors remain unchanged, the equity 
pledge makes the actual cash flow right hold by the con-
trolling shareholder decline, which weakens the incentive 
effect. Therefore it has a negative impact on corporate value.
H3B: When other factors remain unchanged, the risk 
of transfer of control rights will make it easier to encroach 
on the profit of the company and minority shareholders af-
ter the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge, so that the 
positive correlation between control and corporate value 
is weakened, which reduces corporate value.
H4: The controlling shareholder’s equity pledge will 
expand the separation of cash flow rights and control 
rights, and cause agency problems resulting in lower cor-
porate value.
2.1.3 The Impact of Controlling Shareholder 
Equity Pledge on Corporate value From the Ac-
counting Perspective
Wang et al., [12] believed that the controlling shareholder 
equity pledge will reduce the corporate performance level. 
Other scholars [13] found that the more concentrated the 
equity, the more conducive to the concentration of re-
sources and the use of control with operational efficiency 
improved. Therefore, we propose Hypothesis 5:
H5: The equity pledge ratio of the controlling sharehold-
er is negatively correlated with the corporate performance 
when other factors remain unchanged, but the concentration 
of ownership will weaken this negative correlation.
2.1.4 The Impact of Controlling Shareholder Eq-
uity Pledge on Corporate Value When Consider-
ing Equity Checks and Balances
Ruan et al. [14] found the balance of equity has a posi-
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tive impact on corporate value creation within a certain 
range and presents the “inverted U-shaped” change law. 
Based on this, we propose the Hypothesis 6 as follows: 
H6: The balance of equity is beneficial to internal 
control and corporate governance when other factors are 
unchanged. Put another way, when there is equity balance, 
the negative effect of the controlling shareholder’s equity 
pledge on corporate value will be reduced.
2.2 Model Construction and Variable Definition
The data type in this paper is mixed cross-section data. We 
use multiple linear regression models to verify the linear 
relationship between related variables and test whether the 
hypotheses are true.
2.2.1 The Influence of Controlling Shareholder 
Information on Corporate Value
This section builds a regression model for studying the re-
lationship between the cash flow rights and control of the 
controlling shareholder and corporate value. According to 
the research of Claessens et al. [9], we use cash flow rights 
and control rights as the measurement of the ownership and 
control of the company by the controlling shareholder.
Model I: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6/i i i i i i i iTobinQ Cash Vote Lgsize Lev Growth Industry Stateβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6/i i i i i i i iTobinQ Cash Vote Lgsize Lev Growth Industry Stateβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +  (1)
This model is applied to test the relationship between 
cash flow rights, control rights and company value, and to 
verify whether Hypothesis 1 is established.
Model II: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6i i i i i i iTobinQ Cvv Lgsize Lev Growth Industry Stateβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + + 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6i i i i i i iTobinQ Cvv Lgsize Lev Growth Industry Stateβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +  (2)
We employ this model to test the relationship between 
the separation of the two powers and corporate value, and 
to verify whether the Hypothesis 2 is hold.  
Among them, TobinQ  is used to measure the value of 
the company ( the replacement cost is measured by the 
book value of the company’s total assets) ; i iCash Cvv、  
represent the controlling shareholder information which 
refers to the cash flow rights owned by the controlling 
shareholder and the separation of the two powers; iLev  
is the equity multiplier, measuring the size of the corpo-
rate financial leverage; iLgsize  measures the size of the 
company which is the logarithm of the corporate total 
assets; iGrowth  represents the corporate future growth 
ability, and is measured by total operating income growth 
rate. iIndustry  denotes the industry in which the listed 
company is located. This paper divides the selected sam-
ples into 17 industries (excluding the financial industry) 
in concert with the 2012 edition of the Guidelines for the 
Classification of Listed Companies. iState  is a dummy 
variable, and it is 0 for state-owned listed company and 1 
for private listed company.
In line with Claessens et al. [9], this study selects cash 
flow rights as a measure of ownership, voting rights as a 
proxy of control rights, and the ratio of cash flow rights 
to voting rights as a measure of the separation of two 
powers. The sum of ownership in the control chains can 
be used to measure the cash flow rights. The ownership in 
each control chain is the product of the shareholding ratios 
on this chain. If the controlling shareholder’s shareholding 
ratio at each level of the control chain is iR , then the cash 
flow right is Ri∑ ∏（） .
Refer to Hao and Liang [2], the voting rights are ex-
pressed as the sum of the smallest current prices of vot-
ing rights at each level of the control chain, i.e. voting 
rights 1 2,[min( , ... )]i i imR R R= ∑ , ijR  is the voting right 
of the layer j  on the control chain i . 
The ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights is an in-
dicator to measure the degree of separation of the two 
powers. Since the cash flow rights are always less than or 
equal to the voting rights, the value of the variable is be-
tween 0 and 1. The larger the value, the lower the degree 
of separation of the two powers.
2.2.2 The Influence of Controlling Shareholder 
Pledge on Corporate Value
This part is mainly to construct a research model of the 
controlling shareholder’s equity pledge to corporate value. 
The first section considers the impact of the expansion of 
separation of the two powers caused by the equity pledge 
on corporate value; the second section is based on the 
corporate performance, indirectly measuring the impact of 
the equity pledge on corporate value. ROA  is selected as 
the measure of company performance, and the controlling 
shareholder pledge rate ( 1Pledge ) and the major share-
holding ratio ( Stockrate ) are used as control variables. 
The third section is to study the impact of controlling 
shareholder pledge on corporate value in the case of equi-
ty checks and balances, and the controlling shareholder’s 
equity pledge rate and equity balance Z  are added as ex-
planatory variables. 
Model III: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6/i i i i i i i iTobinQ Cash Vote Lgsize Lev Growth Industry Stateβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6/i i i i i i i iTobinQ Cash Vote Lgsize Lev Growth Industry Stateβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +   (3)
1 2 1= + iPledgeβ α α
This model tests the relationship between the cash flow 
rights, control rights and corporate value under the con-
dition that the controlling shareholder pledged equity to 
verify whether the Hypothesis 3 is true. 
Model IV：
0 1 2 3 4 5 6i i i i i i iTobinQ Cvv Lgsize Lev Growth Industry Stateβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +
0 1 2 3 4 5 6i i i i i i iTobinQ Cvv Lgsize Lev Growth Industry Stateβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +   (4)
1 1 2 1= + iPledgeβ α α
This model measures the relationship between the 
change of the separation of the two rights caused by the 
controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and corporate 
value for Hypothesis 4. 1Pledge is an independent vari-
able which represents the controlling shareholder’s equity 
pledge. Yeh et al, 2003 [6] shown that when the corporate 
share price falls, the value of the pledged equity decreases 
and the pledgee will require the pledger to provide more 
protection to compensate the decline value of equity. It 
will make the controlling shareholder unreasonably uses 
the corporate related assets to maintain the stock price (that 
is, the market value management), so the equity pledge 
will expand the leverage effect of the control resulting in 
more serious agency problem and lower corporate value.
In Model III and Model IV, the 1β  is analyzed as fol-
lows: 
(1) If both 1α  and 2α  are greater than zero, then the 
controlling shareholder information is positively cor-
related with corporate value, and the more the equity is 
pledged, the more significant this positive correlation is. 
(2) If 1α is greater than zero and 2α is less than zero, 
then the controlling shareholder information is positively 
correlated with corporate value, and the less the equity is 
pledged, the more significant this positive correlation is. 
(3) If 1α  is less than zero and 2α  is greater than zero, 
then the controlling shareholder information is negatively 
correlated with corporate value, and the more the equity is 
pledged, the more significant this negative correlation is. 
(4) If both 1α  and 2α  are less than zero, then the con-
trolling shareholder information is negatively correlated 
with corporate value, and the less the equity is pledged, 
the more significant this negative correlation is.
Model V:
0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7i i i i i i i iROA Pledge Stockrate Lgsize Lev Growth Industry Stateβ β β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + + +
0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7i i i i i i i iROA Pledge Stockrate Lgsize Lev Growth Industry Stateβ β β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + + +  (5)
We apply this model to find out the correlation between 
the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and the cor-
porate performance for Hypothesis 5. Since the corporate 
performance has positive impact on corporate value, the 
impact of the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on 
the corporate performance can indirectly detect the influ-
ence on corporate value which enables us to analyze the 
impact of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on cor-
porate value from the accounting perspective. 
Model VI:
0 1 1 2 3 4i i i i iTobinQ Pledge Stockrate Lgsize Levβ β β β β= + + + +  
5 6 7i i iGrowth Industry Stateβ β β ε+ + + +  (6)
1 1 2 iZβ α α= +
Model VI is a nested model, which verifies the impact 
of the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on corporate 
value in the presence of equity checks and balances, and 
also verifies whether Hypothesis 6 is hold. Z  is a measure 
of the equity balance which is obtained by dividing the 
sum of the shareholding ratio of the second to fifth largest 
shareholders by the shareholding ratio of the controlling 
shareholder. In other words, Z  measures the balance of 
the remaining major shareholders of the company against 
the controlling shareholder.
3. Data
This paper selects a relatively complete sample of rel-
evant information disclosure for the listed company in 
2014-2017. The data is collected from the Wind Database, 
CSMAR Database, and the Choice Database. Specifically, 
the actual controller information and financial data of the 
required company are sourced from the CSMAR Data-
base, the equity pledge data is derived from the Wind Da-
tabase and the Choice Database. Nowadays, the laws and 
regulations related to the equity pledge of China’s capital 
market is not standarded for the announcement of the eq-
uity pledge. Therefore, the information related to the eq-
uity pledge disclosed in the market is not comprehensive, 
and the first-hand data collected is difficult to conduct 
research and analysis. To solve this problem, this article 
firstly combines the annual reports of the listed company 
and the announcement related to the equity pledge, and 
then manually proofread and improve relevant informa-
tion. 
In the data processing, we deal with data and obtain a 
total of 10,448 research samples as following steps: 
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(1) The listed companies with incomplete data or insuf-
ficient disclosure are excluded at first. 
(2) Exclude financial and insurance companies because 
the particularity of these companies make them very dif-
ferent from other industries, which may affect the robust-
ness of research conclusions. 
(3) Exclude companies that are ST, *ST.
(4) Use Stata to perform a 1% level of Winsorize pro-
cessing on the samples. 
4. Results Analysis
4.1 Correlation Analysis
In this paper, the Pearson correlation coefficient is used to 
analyze the correlation between variables. Since there are 
three major types of models in this paper, the correlation 
between variables is discussed in three cases. 
As is shown in Table 1, except for the cross terms, the 
correlation coefficients between almost all variables is 
less than 0.5. Therefore, for the controlling shareholder 
information and corporate value research model, there is 
no multi-collinearity problem.
In Table 2, the correlation coefficients are all less than 
0.5, so there is no multi-collinearity problem in terms of 
the company performance and the controlling shareholder 
equity pledge ratio model. And judging from the correla-
tion coefficients, there is a significant negative correlation 
between the controlling shareholder pledge ratio and the 
total return on assets, which is in line with our research 
hypotheses.
Same as the previous analysis, there is no multicol-
linearity problem in the model of the influence of the 
controlling shareholder’s equity pledge ratio on corporate 
value, with result shown in Table 3. 
Table 1. Correlation Analysis between Controlling Shareholder Information and Corporate Value
Variable 
name TobinQ Cash Vote Cvv 1Pledge
1Pledge
*Cash
1Pledge
*Vote
1Pledge
*Cvv
ROA Lgsize Lev Growth
TobinQ 1
Cash -0.060*** 1
Vote -0.087***
0.862
*** 1
Cvv 0.038***
0.520
***
0.061
*** 1
1Pledge
-0.070
***
-0.14
***
-0.078
***
-0.151
*** 1
1Pledge
*Cash
-0.061
***
0.492
***
0.434
***
0.230
***
0.6928
*** 1
1Pledge
*Vote
-0.081
***
0.297
***
0.444
***
-0.12
***
0.7910
***
0.905
*** 1
1Pledge
*Cvv
-0.050
***
0.096
***
-0.06
***
0.292
***
0.8593
***
0.803
***
0.687
*** 1
ROA 0.267***
0.096
***
0.113
***
0.032
***
-0.106
***
-0.008
*** -0.021
-0.080
*** 1
Lgsize -0.608
*
0.190
***
0.227
***
-0.02
***
0.0804
***
0.112
***
0.147
***
0.042
***
-0.089
*** 1
Lev -0.319***
0.045
***
0.060
***
-0.04
***
0.1067
***
0.133
***
0.157
***
0.071
***
-0.367
***
0.435
*** 1
Growth 0.0214**
-0.02
**
-0.02
* 0.002
0.0692
***
0.074
***
0.0712
***
0.075
***
0.188
***
0.051
*** 0.0093 1
Note: *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5%, and * indicates significant at 10% (the same below).
Table 2. Correlation Analysis between Company Performance and Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge Ratio
Variable name ROA 1Pledge Stockrate Lgsize Lev Growth
ROA 1
1Pledge -0.106*** 1
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4.2 Regression Analysis
4.2.1 Influence of Controlling Shareholder Infor-
mation on Corporate Value without Considering 
Equity Pledge
Table 4 reports the regression results of Model I. We find 
that the regression coefficients of the independent vari-
ables Cash and Vote are 1.2130 and 1.0762, respectively, 
and are significant at the level of 1% which indicates 
that the Hypothesis 1 is true. That is to say, the cash flow 
rights and control rights are positively correlated with the 
corporate value. With the increase of cash flow rights, 
the incentive effect is enhanced. And the accompanying 
increase in control also reduces agency problems and 
conflicts of interest to a certain extent, which helps to im-
prove the value of the company. From the perspective of 
control variables, there is a significant negative correlation 
between company size and financial leverage and corpo-
rate value, in which the negative correlation between com-
pany size and corporate value is stronger. In terms of the 
growth rate of operating income, the regression coefficient 
is significantly positive at the level of 1% indicating that 
the growth rate of operating income is positively correlat-
ed with corporate value. From the perspective of property 
right character, the value of private companies as a whole 
is higher than that of state-owned enterprises.
Table 4. Regression result of Model I
Independent variable: 
Cahh
Independent vari-
able: Vote
Variable Coefficients 𝑡 value Coefficients 𝑡 value
Constant 27.3813*** 51.38 27.4822*** 51.59
Cash 1.213*** 9.61 —— ——
Vote —— —— 1.076*** 8.19
Lgsize -2.616*** -46.34 -2.626*** -46.37
Lev -0.112*** -5.02 -0.114*** -5.11
Growth 0.233*** 4.43 0.233*** 4.45
Industry
State
Control
0.577***
Control
14.77
Control
0.540***
Control
14.17
Samplesize 10,448 10,448
F value 1018.61*** 1002.90***
Adjusted R2 0.3879 0.3865
Note: *** indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5%, * 
indicates significant at 10%; model results have been tested for hetero-
scedasticity and processed. 
In Table 5, the Cvv  ’s coefficient of Model II is 0.4035, 
and it is significant at the level of 1%, which can prove 
that the Hypothesis 2 is hold, that is, under the same con-
ditions, the degree of separation between cash flow rights 
and control rights is negatively correlated with corporate 
value.
Stockrate 0.108*** -0.100*** 1
Lgsize -0.089*** 0.080*** 0.211*** 1
Lev -0.367*** 0.107*** 0.058*** 0.435*** 1
Growth 0.188*** 0.069*** -0.037*** 0.051*** 0.009 1
Table 3. Correlation Analysis of Model Variables of Stockholders’ Equity Pledge on Corporate Value under Equity 
Check and Balance
Variable name TobinQ 1Pledge Z 1*Pledge Z Stockrate Lgsize Lev Growth
TobinQ 1
1Pledge
-0.070
*** 1
Z 0.141*** 0.0597*** 1
1*Pledge Z
-0.034
*** 0.6005***
0.704
*** 1
Stockrate -0.081***
-0.100
***
-0.668
***
-0.481
*** 1
Lgsize -0.608
***
0.080
***
-0.141
***
0.029
*
0.211
*** 1
Lev -0.319***
0.107
***
-0.133
***
-0.036
**
0.058
*** 0.435*** 1
Growth 0.0214** 0.069***
0.089
***
0.097
***
-0.037
*** 0.051*** 0.009 1
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Table 5. Regression result of Model II
Variable Coefficients t value
Constant 26.8743** 48.59
Cvv 0.4035*** 4.39
Lgsize -2.5537*** -44.76
Lev -0.1184*** -5.32
Growth 0.2244*** 4.29
Industry control control
State 0.5253*** 13.73
Samplesize 10,448
F value 999.95***
Adjusted R2 0.3839
4.2.2 The Influence of Controlling Shareholder 
Pledge on Corporate Value
As is shown in Table 6, all variables except the finan-
cial leverage variable 𝐿𝑒𝑣 are significant at the 1% level. 
The main independent variables’ regression coefficients 
are positive, but the regression coefficients of the cross 
term are significantly negative which is consistent with the 
case of α1 >0, α2 < 0 proposed in the model construction 
part. That is to say, the cash flow rights and control rights 
owned by the controlling shareholder are 
positively correlated with corporate value, and the less 
the equity is pledged, the more significant the positive 
correlation is.
Table 7. regression result of Model IV
Variable 
nature
Variable 
name
Regression coeffi-
cients 𝑡 value
Constant 
term Constant 29.3885
*** 29.90
Independent
variable 𝐶𝑣𝑣 0.1079 0.76
Cross term 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒1 ∗ 
𝐶𝑣𝑣
-0.3743*** -3.27
𝐿𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 -2.8195*** -27.39
𝐿𝑒𝑣 -0.0195 -0.49
Control 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 0.2687*** 3.89
variable 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 control control
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 0.5543*** 6.97
Sample size 4,402
F value 318.45***
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.3587
In Table 7, the cross-term regression coefficient is sig-
nificantly negative. This is in line with the case of α1 >0, 
Table 6. regression result of Model III
Model Independent variable: 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ Independent variable:𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒
Variable               Varianame
nature  name Regression  coefficients 𝑡 value Regression coefficients 𝑡 value
Constant term Constant  29.1560*** 30.72  29.3493***  31.24
Independent 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  1.2454***  4.84  ——   ——
variable  𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒  ——  ——  1.3475***   5.75
𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒1 ∗  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  -0.9616*** -3.02  ——   ——
𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒1 ∗  𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒  ——  ——  -0.7734***  -2.96
  Lgsize  -2.8280*** -27.80  -2.8568***  -28.18
  Lev  -0.0212  -0.53  -0.0222   -0.55
Control  𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  0.2640***  3.83  0.2672***   3.87
variable                 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦  Control  Control  Control   Control
  State  0.5945***  7.50  0.5639***   7.28
Sample size 4,402 4,402
F value 317.9*** 318.03***
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.3609 0.3619
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α2 < 0 proposed in the model construction part. It also in-
dicates that the separation of the two powers is negatively 
correlated with the corporate value, and the controlling 
shareholder equity pledge will further weaken corporate 
value.
4.2.3 Study on the Impact of Controlling Share-
holder Equity Pledge on Corporate Value based 
on Accounting Perspective
Table 8. regression result of Model V
Variable nature variable name Regression 
coefficients
𝑡 value
Constant term       Constant -0.1141*** -6.90
Independent        𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒1 -0.0155*** -6.79
variable                                     𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 0.0523*** 9.50
                                                                    𝐿𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 0.0167*** 9.64
                                                                    𝐿𝑒𝑣 -0.0157*** -23.18
Control variable                    𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 0.0192*** 13.94
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 Control Control
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 0.0154*** 5.93
Number of samples 4,402
F value 162.81***
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.1808
In the regression result of Model V, the regression coef-
ficient of the equity pledge ratio of the controlling share-
holder is -0.0155 and it is significant at the level of 1%, 
indicating that the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge 
has a significant negative correlation with the corporate 
performance. After adding the control variable, Stockrate
false, its regression coefficient is significantly positive, 
which means that there is a significant positive correlation 
between equity concentration and company performance. 
This proves that Hypothesis 5 is hold. That is, the share-
holding pledge ratio of the controlling shareholder is neg-
atively correlated with the company’s performance under 
the condition that other factors remain unchanged, but the 
concentration of ownership will weaken this negative cor-
relation. From the perspective of other control variables, 
company size and operating income growth rate have a 
positive impact on company performance, while financial 
leverage is negatively correlated with company perfor-
mance. In terms of the property nature, State’s regression 
coefficient is significantly positive, which indicates that 
the performance of private enterprises is superior to state-
owned enterprises as a whole.
4.2.4 The Impact of Controlling Shareholder Eq-
uity Pledge on Corporate Value When Consider-
ing Equity Checks and Balances
Table 9. regression result of Model VI
Variable nature Variable Coefficient t value
Constant term Constant 29.308*** 31.06
Independent variable 1Pledge -0.377*** -2.91
Cross term 1*Pledge Z 0.1758* 1.89
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 1.2693*** 4.75
𝐿𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 -2.8479*** -28.08
Control variable 𝐿𝑒𝑣 -0.0211 -0.52
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 0.2618*** 3.80
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 Control control
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 0.5650*** 7.26
Number of samples 4,402
F value 280.58***
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.3
It can be seen from Table 9 that the regression coef-
ficient is -0.3770, and it is significant at the level of 1%, 
which indicates that the controlling shareholder’s equity 
pledge ratio is significantly negatively correlated with 
corporate value. While considering the balance of equity, 
cross-terms between equity balance and pledge ratio of 
the controlling shareholder is significantly positive which 
reveals that the balance of equity weakens the negative 
effect of the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on 
corporate value. From the perspective of control variables, 
equity concentration and operating income growth rate are 
significantly positively correlated with corporate value.
4.3 Suggestion
According to the findings of this article, the controlling 
shareholder’s equity pledge has a negative impact on cor-
porate value and company performance which increases 
the risk of investment and form a bad expectation of the 
financing behavior, and then affect the further develop-
ment of China’s capital market. Therefore, this paper pro-
poses the following suggestions for problems arising in 
the process of equity pledge.
(1) Regulators should formulate regulations to im-
prove the information disclosure of equity pledge. In 
addition, the specific information on the equity pledge 
project should also be properly disclosed, which will help 
strengthen the supervision of the project and prevent the 
abuse of applying financing method of equity pledge.
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(2) It is essential to further broaden the financing chan-
nels of private enterprises and alleviate the financing diffi-
culties of private enterprises. The most important influenc-
ing factors of equity pledge are the less financing methods 
and financing difficulties. Under this circumstance, many 
enterprises are forced to choose equity pledge for financ-
ing which leads to a vicious circle.
(3) From the perspective of the company itself, inter-
nal control should be strengthened to improve internal 
governance. The company should properly improve the 
shareholding structure, and introduce strategic investors 
as equity balancers to supervise and restrict the behavior 
of the corporate controlling shareholders and to prevent 
the emergence of agency problems. The corporate super-
visory department can set the upper limit of the pledge ra-
tio. In addition, the responsibilities of the corporate board 
of supervisors should be strengthened to supervise equity 
pledge.
(4) From the perspective of stakeholders, they should 
strengthen supervision of the company and respond in a 
timely manner. As the corporate creditors, when lending 
to the company, corresponding provisions should be es-
tablished to restrict the equity pledge of the corporate im-
portant shareholders. For other small and medium share-
holders, the investment should be withdrawn in time if the 
purpose of the funds is unknown.
5. Conclusion
This paper uses nested models and multiple linear re-
gression models to analyze the empirical data on equity 
pledge and fundamentals of sample companies from 2014 
to 2017. In the end, the following conclusions are drawn:
(1) Without considering the pledge of equity, the cash 
flow rights and voting rights owned by the controlling 
shareholder are positively related to corporate value. 
However, when the separation of the two rights occurs, 
the controlling shareholder’s cost of encroachment is re-
duced due to the separation between the cash flow rights 
and the voting rights. Then, the agency problem occurs 
which leads to the decrease of corporate value.
(2) The controlling shareholder’s equity pledge aggra-
vates the separation of the two power, which weaken the 
incentive effect and strengthen the encroachment effect, 
and eventually lead to the reduction of corporate value.
(3) From the perspective of the corporate performance 
conduction chain, the controlling shareholder’s equity 
pledge behavior will affect the corporate performance and 
corporate value through conduction.
(4) Seeing from the research on equity checks and bal-
ances, when there exists equity balance, the controlling 
shareholder’s equity pledge will be supervised and re-
stricted by other major shareholders, thereby reducing the 
possibility of agent problems, which in turn reduce the 
negative impact on corporate value. The higher the equity 
balance, the weaker the negative impact of the controlling 
shareholder’s equity pledge on corporate value.
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